Various papers have presented folk theorem results for repeated games with private monitoring that rely on belief-free equilibria. I show that these equilibria are not robust against small perturbations in the behavior of potential opponents. Specifically, I show that essentially none of the belief-free equilibria is evolutionarily stable, and that in generic games none of these equilibria is neutrally stable. Moreover, in a large family of games (which includes many public good games), the belief-free equilibria fail to satisfy even a very mild stability refinement.
Introduction
The theory of repeated games provides a formal framework to explore the possibility of cooperation in longterm relationships, such as collusion between firms. The various folk theorem results (e.g., Fudenberg and Maskin, 1986; Fudenberg, Levine, and Maskin, 1994) have established that efficiency can be achieved under fairly general conditions when players observe commonly shared information about past action profiles.
In many real-life situations players privately observe imperfect signals about past actions. For example, each firm in a cartel privately observes its own sales, which contain imperfect information about secret price cuts that its competitors offer to some of their customers. Formal analysis of private monitoring began with the pioneering work of Sekiguchi (1997) . Since then, several papers have presented various folk theorem results that have shown that efficiency can be achieved also with private monitoring (see Kandori, 2002; Mailath and Samuelson, 2006 , for surveys of this literature).
The most commonly used equilibrium in the literature on private monitoring is the belief-free equilibrium in which the continuation strategy of each player is a best reply to his opponent's strategy at every private history. These equilibria are called "belief-free" because a player's belief about his opponent's history is not needed to compute a best reply. Piccione (2002) and Ely and Välimäki (2002) present folk theorem results for the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma using belief-free equilibria under the assumptions that the monitoring long-run average behavior in the population (see, e.g., Benaïm, Hofbauer, and Hopkins, 2009 ). Motivated by this, I present a novel, and very mild, notion of stability. I say that a strategy s is vulnerable to strategy s if agents who follow strategy s achieve a strictly higher payoff in any heterogeneous population in which some agents follow strategy s and some follow strategy s . The definition implies that a small group of mutants who play strategy s will take over a population that initially plays strategy s. I say that a symmetric Nash equilibrium s * is weakly stable if there does not exist a finite sequence of strategies (s 1 , ..., s K ), such that: (1) strategy s * is vulnerable to s 1 , (2) each strategy s k is vulnerable to s k+1 , and (3) strategy s K is evolutionarily stable.
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The definition implies that any symmetric game admits a weakly stable strategy, and that if s * is not weakly stable, then it is not a plausible prediction of long-run behavior. This is because as soon as a small group of agents experiments with playing s 1 , the population diverges to s 1 . If this is followed by an invasion of a small group of agents who play s 2 , then the population diverges to s 2 , and after a finite number of such sequential invasions, the population diverges to s K , and it will remain in s K in the long run (due to s K being evolutionarily stable).
3 A simple example of a non-weakly stable equilibrium is a mixed equilibrium in a coordination game, for which every small perturbation takes the population to one of the pure equilibria.
Weak Stability of Belief-free Equilibria I say that a symmetric game is recursively strict, if, for any subset of actions, the game in which each player is restricted to choosing an action from the subset admits a strict symmetric equilibrium. Examples of this family of games include the Prisoner's Dilemma, the Traveler's Dilemma, symmetric coordination games, and many public good games. My next result (Proposition 3)
focuses on this family of games, and shows that only trivial belief-free equilibria satisfy the mild refinement of weak stability. The intuition for the Prisoner's Dilemma is that any belief-free equilibrium is vulnerable to a deterministic strategy s in which the players defect in each period in which defection is an optimal action with respect to the belief-free equilibrium, and this strategy s is vulnerable to the evolutionarily stable strategy of always defecting. Remark 3 sketches how to extend this result to the larger set of belief-free review-strategy equilibria (Matsushima, 2004; Yamamoto, 2007; Deb, 2012; Yamamoto, 2012) .
The Hawk-Dove game, which is a common application of belief-free equilibria, does not admit a strict symmetric equilibrium, and thus the results so far only show that non-trivial belief-free equilibria are not neutrally stable. The main difficulty in analyzing weak stability in Hawk-Dove games is that, in general, it is an open question whether a repeated game with private monitoring admits an evolutionarily stable strategy when the underlying game does not admit a strict symmetric equilibrium. My next result (Proposition 4) shows that a belief-free equilibrium in the repeated Hawk-Dove game is weakly stable if and only if the monitoring structure is such that the repeated game does not admit evolutionarily stable strategies. The "only if" side of the result shows that if an evolutionarily stable strategy exists, then there must be a sequence of strategies, each of which is vulnerable to its successor, that starts with the belief-free equilibrium and ends in an evolutionarily stable strategy. The "if" side of this result is trivial: if the repeated game does not admit any evolutionarily stable strategy, then there cannot be a sequence of strategies ending in an evolutionarily stable strategy, and, as a result, any Nash equilibrium is weakly stable.
An important alternative approach to belief-free equilibria in the literature on private monitoring is the "belief-based" equilibrium. Bhaskar and Obara (2002) define these equilibria and apply them to the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma. My final result (Claim 1) shows that the particular "belief-based" equilibria that are presented in Bhaskar and Obara (2002) do not satisfy weak stability.
Related Literature and Contribution
Conditionally Correlated Signals A few papers in the literature yield stable cooperation if the private signals are sufficiently correlated conditional on the action profile. Mailath and Morris (2002 ), Hörner and Olszewski (2009 ), and Mailath and Olszewski (2011 show that when the private signals are almost perfectly correlated conditional on the action profile (i.e., when there is almost public monitoring), then any sequential equilibrium of the nearby public monitoring game with bounded memory remains an equilibrium also with almost public monitoring. Some of these equilibria are evolutionarily stable, and, in particular, cooperation can be the outcome of an evolutionarily stable strategy. Kandori (2011) presents the notion of weakly belief-free equilibria, in which the strategy of each player is a best reply to any private history of the opponent up to the actions of the previous round. Unlike standard belief-free equilibria, players need to form the correct beliefs about the signal obtained by the opponent in the previous round. Kandori (2011) demonstrates that if there is sufficient correlation between private signals (conditional on the action profile), then the game admits a strict, weakly belief-based equilibrium that yields substantial cooperation. The strictness of the equilibrium implies that it satisfies the refinement of evolutionary stability. In the discussion paper version of his paper Kandori (2009) points out that the specific non-trivial belief-free equilibria of Ely and Välimäki (2002) do not satisfy evolutionary stability in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma. The present paper substantially strengthens Kandori's observation in at least two important ways: (1) I show that any non-trivial belief-free equilibrium of any underlying game is not evolutionarily stable, and, moreover, it is not neutrally stable under the mild assumptions that the game is generic and the monitoring structure has a grain of informativeness, and (2) I show that in the large family of recursively strict games, any non-trivial belief-free equilibrium fails to satisfy the very mild refinement of weak stability. Compte (1998) , Kandori and Matsushima (1998) , and Obara (2009) present folk theorem results that rely on (noiseless) communication between the players at each stage of the repeated game. The players use this communication to publicly report (possibly with some delay) the private signals they obtain. These equilibria are constructed such that the players have strict incentives while playing, and such that they are always indifferent between reporting the truth and lying regardless of the reporting strategy of the opponent. One can show that this property implies that these equilibria are neutrally stable, and hence also weakly stable.
Communication and Conditionally Independent Signals
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The present paper shows that all the mechanisms in the existing literature can yield only defection as the outcome of a weakly stable equilibrium in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with conditionally independent 4 The argument for neutral stability is sketched as follows. Having strict incentives while playing implies that any best-reply strategy induces the same play on the equilibrium path, and differs from the incumbent strategy only by sending false reports. The fact that players are always indifferent between reporting the truth and lying implies that any such best-reply strategy yields the same payoff as the incumbent strategy (both when the opponent is an incumbent as well as when he is a mutant who follows a best-reply strategy). suggest that communication between players is critical to obtaining collusive behavior whenever the private imperfect monitoring between the firms is such that the conditional correlation between the private signals is sufficiently low.
5,6
One promising direction toward the solution of this open question might rely on the methods developed in Heller and Mohlin (2015) for the related setup of random matching and partial observation of the partner's past behavior. In that setup, Heller and Mohlin (2015) characterize conditions under which only defection is stable, and construct novel mechanisms for sustaining stable cooperative equilibria whenever these conditions are not satisfied.
Robustness Sugaya and Takahashi (2013) show that "generically" only belief-free equilibria are robust against small perturbations in the monitoring structure. Our main result shows that belief-free equilibria (except for defection) are not robust against small perturbations in the behavior of the potential opponents.
Taken together, the two results suggest that defection is the unique equilibrium outcome of the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma that is robust against both kinds of perturbations.
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Structure The model is described in Section 2. Section 3 presents the results for symmetric games. The appendix extends the analysis to asymmetric games.
Model
Games with Private Monitoring
I analyze a two-player δ-discounted repeated game with private monitoring. I use the index i ∈ {1, 2} to refer to one of the players, and −i to refer to the opponent. Each player i has a finite action set A i and a finite set of signals Σ i . An action profile is an element of A 1 × A 2 . I use ∆W to represent the set of probability distributions over a finite set W . Let ∆A i and ∆A 1 × ∆A 2 represent respectively the set of mixed actions 5 This empirical prediction can be tested experimentally by comparing how subjects play the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with private monitoring and conditionally independent signals with and without the ability to communicate by exchanging "cheap talk" messages. Matsushima, Tanaka, and Toyama (2013) experimentally study this setup without communication, and their findings suggest that the subjects' behavior is substantially different from the predictions of the belief-free equilibria (in particular, subjects retaliate more severely when monitoring is more accurate). I am not aware of any experiment that studies this setup with communication.
6 See also the recent related result of Awaya and Krishna (2016) , which deals with sequential equilibria of oligopolies under some plausible private monitoring structures, and shows that cheap talk communication allows one to achieve a higher level of collusion relative to the maximal level that one can achieve without communication.
7 Two existing papers present related anti-folk theorem results. Matsushima (1991) shows that defection is the unique pure equilibrium in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma in which signals are conditionally independent and Nash equilibria are restricted to being independent of payoff-irrelevant private histories. As demonstrated by the "belief-based" equilibria of Bhaskar and Obara (2002) , the uniqueness result does not hold for mixed equilibria (the mixed "belief-based" equilibria achieve cooperation even though the behavior of the players is independent of payoff-irrelevant private histories, and signals may be conditionally independent). Peski (2012) studies repeated games with private monitoring. He assumes that strategies have a finite past, in each period players' preferences over actions are modified by smooth idiosyncratic shocks, the monitoring structures includes infinitely many signals, and the signals are sufficiently connected. Under these assumptions, Peski (2012) shows that all equilibria of the repeated game are trivial, in the sense that each period's play is an equilibrium of the stage game.
for player i and mixed action profiles. For each player i let u i : A 1 × A 2 → R denote the payoff function, which is extended to mixed actions in the standard (linear) way.
For each possible action profile (a 1 , a 2 ) ∈ A 1 ×A 2 , the monitoring distribution m (·|a 1 , a 2 ) specifies a joint probability distribution over the set of signal profiles Σ 1 × Σ 2 . When action profile a is played and signal profile (σ 1 , σ 2 ) is realized, each player i privately observes his corresponding signal σ i . Let m i (·|a 1 , a 2 ) be the marginal probability distribution over the signal of player i:
Lettingũ i (a i , σ i ) denote the payoff to player i from action a i and signal σ i , I can represent stage payoffs as a function of mixed action profiles only:
To simplify the presentation of the results, I assume that the marginal distribution of signals of each player has a full support, i.e., that each signal is observed with a positive probability after each action profile.
Formally:
8 Assumption 1. The monitoring structure has full support:
One example of a monitoring structure with full support is the conditionally independent -perfect monitoring in which each player privately observes his opponent's last action with probability 1 − and observes the opposite action with the remaining probability .
A t-length private history of player i (abbr., history) is a sequence that includes the action played by the player and the observed signal in each of the previous t rounds of the game. Each player's initial history is the null history, denoted by φ. Let H
t denote the set of all t-length histories of player i, and
, is a pair of t-length histories, one belonging to each player.
Belief-free Equilibria
A repeated-game (behavior) strategy of player i is a mapping s i : 
The condition characterizing a belief-free strategy profile is stronger than that characterizing a sequential equilibrium. In a sequential equilibrium, a player's continuation strategy is the player's best reply given his 8 The results can be adapted to a setup in which the monitoring structure does not have full support. The adaptation requires changing two definitions (and related minor adaptations to the proofs): (1) extending the set of of trivial belief-free equilibria in Definition 2, such that it relates only to histories that occur with positive probability, and (2) refining Definition 6 of weak stability by allowing the strategy s to be neutrally stable, rather than evolutionarily stable (because if the monitoring structure does not have full support, then no strategy is evolutionarily stable).
belief about his opponent's continuation strategy, that is, given a unique probability distribution over the opponent's private histories. In a belief-free strategy profile, a player's continuation strategy is his best reply to his opponent's continuation strategy at every private history. In other words, a sequential equilibrium is a belief-free strategy profile if it has the property that a player's continuation strategy is still the player's best reply when he secretly learns about his opponent's private history.
A simple kind of a belief-free equilibrium, is a strategy profile in which the players play a Nash equilibrium of the underlying game in all periods, and this equilibrium is independent of the history of play. I call such belief-free equilibria trivial. Formally, let N E ((A 1 , A 2 ) , (u 1 , u 2 )) denote the set of Nash equilibria of the 
A trivial equilibrium is pure if the Nash equilibrium played in each round is pure (i.e, |supp (s i (h 
Evolutionary Stability in Symmetric Games
In what follows, I study evolutionary stability in symmetric games. I focus on symmetric games because they are the most popular setup in the evolutionary game theory literature. Appendix A extends the analysis to asymmetric games.
In the setup of symmetric games I omit the index i (e.g., A :
, and
). I say that a strategy s is a symmetric Nash (belief-free) equilibrium if the symmetric strategy profile (s, s) is a Nash (belief-free) equilibrium.
I present a refinement of a symmetric Nash equilibrium that requires robustness against a small group of agents who experiment with a different behavior (see Weibull, 1995 , for an introductory textbook). Suppose that individuals in a large population (technically, a continuum) are repeatedly drawn to play a two-person symmetric game, and that there is an underlying dynamic process of social learning in which more successful strategies (which induce higher average payoffs) become more frequent. Suppose that initially all individuals play the equilibrium strategy s * . Now consider a small group of agents (called mutants) who play a different strategy s . If s is not a best reply to s * , then if the mutants are sufficiently rare they will be outperformed.
If s is a best reply to s * , then the relative success of the incumbents and the mutants depends only on the average payoff they achieve when matched against a mutant opponent. If the incumbents achieve a higher payoff when matched against the mutants, then the mutants are outperformed. Otherwise, the mutants outperform the incumbents, and their strategy gradually takes over the population.
The formal definitions are as follows. I say that two strategies are outcome-equivalent if they always induce the same behavior regardless of the opponent's strategy. Arguably, two outcome-equivalent strategies should be considered as two different ways to represent of the same strategy.
Definition 3. Strategies s, s are outcome-equivalent if: (1) their sets of feasible histories coincide (i.e., h t is feasible given s iff it is feasible given s ), and (2) they coincide after each feasible history (i.e., s (h
for each feasible history h t ). Given a strategy s, let [s] denote its equivalent set (i.e., the set of strategies that are outcome-equivalent to s).
9
Remark 1. Observe that:
1. In a game in which each player acts once, any equivalence set is a singleton.
2. In infinitely repeated games the equivalence set [s] is a singleton iff strategy s is totally mixed (i.e., it assigns a positive probability to each action after each history).
3. Let s a be the strategy that plays action a after any history. The equivalence set [s a ] is the set of strategies that induce a player (Alice) to play action a in the first round, and after any history in which Alice has always played a.
Let U (s, s ) denote the expected discounted payoff to a player following strategy s and facing an opponent who plays strategy s . , 1973; Maynard-Smith, 1982) . A symmetric Nash equilibrium s * is neutrally (evolutionarily) stable if
Definition 4 (Maynard-Smith and Price
Remark 2. It is more common in the evolutionary game theory literature to define an evolutionarily stable strategy as a strategy that satisfies the above inequality for any s ∈ B (s * ) \ {s * }. Both definitions coincide when dealing with one-shot games. This alternative definition is arguably too strict when dealing with repeated games, as it can never be satisfied unless the strategy is totally mixed. Observe that strategy s is an evolutionarily stable strategy (according to Definition 4) iff its equivalence set [s] is an evolutionarily stable setà la Thomas (1985) , which implies that such a strategy is asymptotically stable in the standard replicator dynamics.
Example 1. Consider an underlying game G = (A, u) and a subset of actions A ⊆ A that satisfy that (a , a ) is a strict equilibrium for each a ∈ A . Let (a t ) t be an arbitrary sequence of actions in A (i.e., a t ∈ A for each period t). Observe that the pure strategy that plays action a t in each period t is neutrally stable for any monitoring structure, and it is evolutionarily stable if the monitoring structure has full support.
The key difference between evolutionary stability and neutral stability is whether the mutants are allowed to obtain the same payoff as incumbents in the post-entry population. As a result neutrally stable strategies (which are not evolutionarily stable) may be vulnerable to a random drift of the population away from the initial state. The existing literature typically uses evolutionary stability as a strong refinement of stability, and neutral stability as a mild refinement. 
This motivates me to present a much weaker stability refinement. Strategy s * is vulnerable to strategy s if strategy s achieves a weakly better payoff against both s * and s , and a strictly better payoff against one of these strategies. Formally:
, and at least one of these inequalities is strict.
Definition 5 is equivalent to requiring that for any 0 < β < 1 and any heterogeneous population in which β of the agents follow strategy s and 1 − β of the agents follow strategy s * , the agents following strategy s achieve a strictly higher payoff. The definition implies that mutants who follow strategy s will take over a population that initially plays s * under any dynamic process in which more successful strategies become more frequent. Observe that a neutrally stable strategy is not vulnerable to any other strategy. with playings, the population will diverge tos. If this is followed by another small group of agents who play s , then the population will converge to s , and will remain there in the long run. Note that our argument relies on the assumption that these experimentations are infrequent enough that strategies that are outperformed following the entry of a group of experimenting agents become sufficiently rare before a new group of agents starts experimenting with a different behavior.
5. Definition 6 allows vulnerability to an evolutionarily stable strategy through an arbitrary number of sequential invasions (denoted by K). As shown in the proof of our main result on weak stability (Proposition 3), the maximal number of required invasions is K ≤ |A|. Moreover, if we focus on the existing belief-free equilibria for the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma in the literature (e.g., Ely and Välimäki, 2002; Piccione, 2002) , then most of them are seen to be directly vulnerable to an invasion by players who always defect (i.e., K = 1). 3 Results Ely, Hörner, and Olszewski (2005) characterize the set of belief-free equilibrium payoffs, and show that such strategies support a large set of payoffs. In what follows, I show that only trivial belief-free equilibria may satisfy: (1) evolutionary stability in all games, (2) neutral stability in generic games, and (3) weak stability in the large family of recursively strict games. Next, I strengthen the instability result for Hawk-Dove games, and I sketch why belief-based equilibria (à la Bhaskar and Obara, 2002) do not satisfy weak stability.
Evolutionary Stability in All Games
My first result shows that any evolutionarily stable belief-free equilibrium must be trivial. The sketch of the proof is as follows. Ely, Hörner, and Olszewski (2005, Section 2.1) show that the set of optimal actions in each period t is independent of the history. This implies that mutants who play a symmetric Nash equilibrium in an auxiliary game in which players are only allowed to choose from the set of optimal actions weakly outperform the incumbents. If the belief-free equilibrium is non-trivial, then the mutants' play differs from the incumbents' play, which implies that the belief-free equilibrium is not evolutionarily stable. 
Neutral Stability in Generic Games
As evolutionary stability is a strong refinement, it is desirable to show that belief-free equilibria also fail to satisfy weaker notions of stability. In this subsection, I show that non-trivial belief-free equilibria fail to satisfy the weaker notion of neutral stability under two mild assumptions: (1) the underlying game is generic, and (2) the monitoring structure has a grain of informativeness.
I begin by defining the notions of a generic game and a grain of informativeness. Fix a set of actions A.
Consider a random process in which each payoff u (a, a ) for each pair of actions a, a ∈ A is independently chosen at random from an arbitrary continuous (atomless) distribution. In what follows I require two properties, both of which, hold with probability one in such a process. The first requirement is that the same payoff not appear twice in the payoff matrix. The second requirement is that for each two actions a, a in the support of a mixed equilibrium, the average payoff conditional on both players playing the same action in {a, a} should not be exactly the same as the average payoff conditional on each player playing a different action in {a, a} . I say that games that satisfy these two properties are generic games. Formally:
Definition 7. Symmetric normal-form game G = (A, u) is generic if it satisfies the following two properties:
1. u (a, a ) = u (â, a ) for any actions a =â, a ∈ A.
2. For each non-empty subset of actions A ⊆ A, each symmetric equilibrium α ∈ ∆ (A ) of the restricted game (A , u) , and each two different actions a = a ∈ supp (α), the following inequality holds:
I say that a monitoring structure has a grain of informativeness if for any mixed action played by the players, the joint distribution of action played and signal observed by each player can be used as a (possibly weak) correlation device between the players. Formally: Pr
and
Intuitively, the mild requirement of a grain of informativeness is satisfied whenever the signal a player obtains (combined with his own action) is not completely uninformative about the partner's action. The following example shows how to explicitly construct f + and f − for conditionally independent signals.
Example 2. Consider a game with two actions A = {c, d} and a monitoring structure with two signals Σ = {C, D}, such that player i observes signal C with probability 1 − ( ) if the partner plays c (d) for some < 0.5. Let the functions f + and f − be defined as follows:
The values of f + are positively correlated between the two players because these values differ only if there has been an observation error (a probability that is strictly less than 50%). The values of f − are negatively correlated between the two players, because they coincide with the value of 1 only if there have been two observation errors (which happens with a small probability of O 2 ).
The following result shows that if the game is generic and the monitoring structure has a grain of informativeness, then no non-trivial belief-free equilibrium satisfies neutral stability.
Proposition 2. Assume that G = (A, u) is a generic game and the monitoring structure has a grain of informativeness. Let s * be a symmetric belief-free equilibrium that is also neutrally stable. Then s * is trivial.
Proof. Let γ t = γ t (s * ) ∈ ∆ (A t ) be the marginal distribution of actions played by each player in period t in the belief-free symmetric equilibrium s * . Let T be the sequence of periods in which the support of γ t includes at least two actions, i.e., {t ∈ N| |supp (γ t )| > 1}). If T = ∅, then both players play a pure equilibrium in each period, and s * is trivial. If T = t , then the fact that |γ t | = 1 for every t / ∈ T , implies that both players play a pure equilibrium in each period t / ∈ T , and that the players myopically best-reply to each other in roundt. Due to the fact that s * is a belief-free equilibrium, this implies that each action a ∈ At is a myopic best reply against the partner for any possible history of lengtht, which implies that the players play a Nash equilibrium of the stage game (which is independent of the observed history) in roundt, and that s * is trivial.
Next assume that there existst ∈ T , such that the restricted normal-form game supp γt , u admits a symmetric pure equilibrium. This equilibrium must be strict due to the game being generic. Let s be the strategy that induces mutants to play in each period t =t a symmetric mixed equilibrium (which depends on the period, but not on the observed history) in the restricted normal-form game (supp (γ t ) , u), and to play a strict symmetric equilibrium in the restricted game supp γt , u in periodt. The definition of s and the fact that s * is belief-free imply that U (s , s * ) = U (s * , s * ), and that U (s * , s ) < U (s , s ). The latter inequality holds because the mutants achieve a strictly higher payoff in roundt and a weakly higher payoff against other mutants in all other rounds. This contradicts the assumption that s * is neutrally stable.
Thus, we are left with the case in which there exist t 1 < t 2 ∈ T , such that the restricted normal-form
) admits a symmetric non-pure equilibrium α 1 (α 2 ), i.e., |supp (α 1 )| > 1 (|supp (α 2 )|>1). Assume first that the LHS of (1) is greater than the RHS. Let f + be the function defined in Definition 8 with respect to the mixed action α 1 . Let s + (s + ) be the strategy that induces an agent who follows it (1) to play the mixed action α 1 in round t 1 , (2) to play a symmetric equilibrium in the restricted game (supp (γ t ) , u) in each round t = t 1 , t 2 , and (3) to play on the marginal the mixed equilibrium α 2 in round t 2 , but to condition his play on the values of a 1 (his own action in round t 1 ) and σ 1 (the signals he observed in round t 1 ); specifically, the agent is more (less) likely to play action a and less (more) likely to play action a when f + a k , σ k = 1 . These changes in the probabilities of playing actions a and a are determined, such that, after each history h t2 of length t 2 , the mixture of the mixed action played by an agent who follows strategy s + and the mixed action played by an agent who follows strategys + is α 2 , i.e., for each actionâ ∈ A, 0.5 · s + (h t2 ) (â) + 0.5 ·s
Observe 
Weak Stability in Recursively Strict Symmetric Games
Although neutral stability is considered to be a mild evolutionary refinement, the arguments presented in Section 2.3 suggest that in some setups it may be too strong, and it would be desirable to extend the instability result to a weaker evolutionary refinement. In what follows I study the family of recursively strict games, and show that within this family any weakly stable belief-free equilibrium is trivial.
I say that a symmetric game is recursively strict, if all the symmetric games induced by restricting both players to choosing actions from a given subset of actions admit a strict symmetric equilibrium. Formally: A few examples of recursively strict games are:
1. The Prisoner's Dilemma (as described in Table 1 ).
2. Symmetric coordination games, which satisfy that (a, a) is a strict equilibrium for each action a ∈ A.
3. Games with an ordered set of actions A = {a 1 , ..., a n }, which satisfy that
In particular, such games include:
(a) Traveler's Dilemma game (Basu, 1994) . The set of actions is A = {2, ..., 100} (interpreted as evaluations of the value of one of two lost identical suitcases), both players get a payoff equal to the minimal evaluation, and, in addition, if the evaluations differ, then the player who wrote the lower (higher) evaluation gets a bonus (malus) of 2 to his payoff.
(b) Public good games. The index 1 ≤ k ≤ n is interpreted as the level of contribution to a public good. The payoff for a player who plays a k and whose partner plays
, where the function f is symmetric, strictly supermodular, and increasing in both parameters, the function g is strictly increasing and convex, and
Our next result shows that only trivial and pure belief-free equilibria satisfy the mild refinement of weak stability if the underlying stage game is recursively strict. In particular, the symmetric Prisoner's Dilemma game admits a unique weakly stable belief-free equilibrium in which both players defect in all periods. i.e., s k+1 ∈ B (s k ), and U (s k+1 , s k+1 ) > U (s k , s k+1 ), and (2) sk is a pure strategy in which the players play a strict symmetric equilibrium of the underlying (unrestricted) game in each round t, which implies that sk is evolutionarily stable, and that s * is not weakly stable.
Remark 3 (Instability of Belief-free Review-strategy Equilibria). Matsushima (2004) , Yamamoto (2007 ), and Deb (2012 use the notion of a belief-free review-strategy equilibrium (also called block equilibrium)
in which (1) the infinite horizon is regarded as a sequence of review phases such that each player chooses a constant action throughout a review phase, and (2) at the beginning of each review phase, a player's continuation strategy is a best reply regardless of the history. A simple adaptation of the proof of Proposition 3 show that defection is the unique weakly stable symmetric belief-free review-strategy equilibrium.
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The sketch of the adaptation of the proof is as follows. Let s * be a symmetric belief-free review-strategy equilibrium. Let (t l ) ∞ l=1 be the increasing sequence of starting times for the review phases. The strategy s 1 is adapted such that it is defined in each round t l that begins a review process in an analogous way to the definition given in Proposition 3, and it induces agents who follow it to play the same action up to the end of the l-th review phase. The remaining strategies {s 2 , ..., sk} are defined in the same way as in the proof of Proposition 3, and analogous arguments show that s * is not weakly stable (unless it is is trivial and pure).
Weak Stability in Hawk-Dove Games
The Hawk-Dove game (see the payoff matrix in Table 1 ) is a common application of belief-free equilibria.
This game does not admit a strict symmetric equilibrium, and thus the general results above show only that non-trivial belief-free equilibria are not neutrally stable.
11 The main difficulty in analyzing weak stability of belief-free in Hawk-Dove games is that, in general, it is an open question whether a repeated game without strict symmetric equilibria admits an evolutionarily stable strategy. In this subsection I show that any belief-free equilibrium in the repeated Hawk-Dove game is weakly stable iff the monitoring structure is such that the game admits evolutionarily stable strategies.
The one-shot Hawk-Dove game admits a unique symmetric equilibrium, which is also an evolutionarily stable strategy. Analogous arguments to those appearing in the proof of Proposition 2 show that the trivial belief-free equilibrium in which the players keep playing the symmetric equilibrium of the one-shot game is not neutrally stable in the repeated games if the monitoring structure has a grain of informativeness (because mutants can use past history to induce a negative correlation between their played actions and thus outperform the incumbents).
A repeated Hawk-Dove game with imperfect public monitoring (with full support) admits evolutionarily stable strategies. One example of an evolutionarily stable strategy is the one according to which each agent mixes in the first round with some distribution (α (c) , α (d)), which is chosen such that each player is indifferent between the two actions. If the public signal σ that is observed at the end of the first round is such that the action profile (c, d) is more (less) likely than (d, c), conditional on observing σ, then the players play in all the remaining rounds the deterministic sequence
)).
If both asymmetric action profiles have the same posterior probability conditional on observing σ, then the players randomize according to (α (c) , α (d)) in the next round, and repeat the same procedure described above.
It is an open problem, which is left for future research, whether a repeated Hawk-Dove game with private monitoring admits an evolutionarily (or neutrally) stable strategy. The following result shows that a belieffree equilibrium is weakly stable iff the monitoring structure is such that the repeated Hawk-Dove game does not admit an evolutionarily stable strategy. Let T be the sequence of periods in which both actions are played with positive probability, i.e., {t ∈ N|supp (γ t ) = {c, d}}). Assume first that T is finite, and lett = max (T ) be the last element in T . Observe, that for every t >t, both players play deterministically, and at each such period they choose 11 One can show that any Hawk-Dove game is generic according to Definition 7. Specifically, the LHS of (1) , which is strictly less than the average payoff of the agents conditional on playing different actions (1+g+l). Thus, the result holds for any monitoring structure with a grain of informativeness. the same action. However, this implies s * is not a Nash equilibrium, as one of the players can achieve a strictly higher payoff by choosing the opposite action at each period t >t.
Next, assume that T = N. The fact that both actions are best replies at all periods implies that
, and becauseŝ is evolutionarily stable this equality implies that U (s * ,ŝ) < U (ŝ,ŝ).
Thus, s * is vulnerable toŝ, which implies that s * is not weakly stable.
Thus, we are left with the case in which |T | = ∞ and N\T = ∅. Letα be the unique symmetric equilibrium of the (unrestricted) stage game. Given two periods t k < t l ∈ T , let s (t k ,t l ) be a strategy that induces the mutants to play in each round t = t l a symmetric equilibrium in the restricted game (supp (γ t ) , u). Observe that the mutants who follow s (t k ,t l ) play the mixed equilibriumα in each round t = t l ∈ T . Let a k be the action the agent played at time t k and let σ k be the signal he observed at the end of round t k . In period t l an agent who follows strategy s plays on the marginal the mixed equilibriumα, but he conditions his play on the values of a k and σ k . Specifically, the agent is more likely to play action c and less likely to play action
Let t 0 ∈ N\T . The fact that T is infinite implies that for any > 0, there exist t k < t l ∈ T such that (1) the probability that an agent plays action c at time t l changes by at most conditional on the the value of f − a k , σ k when the agent follows strategy s * and faces a partner who follows strategy s (t k ,t l ) , and (2) the myopic gain from playing α instead of s * (t 0 ) in period t 0 outweighs the maximal possible discounted loss in period t l , i.e.,
Let t k < t l ∈ T be two periods that satisfy these conditions for a sufficiently small . The definition of s (t k ,t l ) and the fact that s * is belief-free implies that U s (t k ,t l ) , s * = U (s * , s * ), and that
The latter inequality holds due to the same argument as in the proof of Proposition 2 (see also footnote 11). This implies that s * is vulnerable to s (t k ,t l ) .
Let sα be the strategy that plays the mixed equilibriumα at all periods (regardless of the observed history). The second condition in the definition of
because the two strategies have the same expected payoff when facing a partner who follows s (t k ,t l ) in all periods in T \ {t l }, and the higher payoff that sα yields in each period in N\T outweighs the lower payoff in
The definition of sα implies that U (sα, sα) = U (ŝ, sα), and becauseŝ is evolutionarily stable this equality implies that U (sα,ŝ) < U (ŝ,ŝ). Thus, sα is vulnerable toŝ, which implies that s * is not weakly stable.
An immediate corollary of Proposition 4 is that repeated Hawk-Dove games with public imperfect monitoring do not admit any weakly stable belief-free equilibria (see Kandori and Obara, 2006 , for an application of belief-free equilibria with public imperfect monitoring).
Instability of the Belief-based Equilibria of Bhaskar and Obara (2002)
Proposition 3 shows that non-trivial belief-free equilibria do not satisfy weak stability in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma. The literature on the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with private monitoring also includes another approach to induce cooperation, namely, the belief-based equilibria of Bhaskar and Obara (2002) .
In what follows I sketch why these particular belief-based equilibria also fail to satisfy weak stability. Bhaskar and Obara (2002) (extending Sekiguchi, 1997 ) present a folk theorem result for the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma that does not rely on belief-free equilibria. Instead, the best reply of each player depends on his belief about the private history of the opponent ("belief-based equilibria"). Bhaskar and Obara (2002) consider a symmetric signaling structure with two signals Σ i = {C, D}, where C (resp., D) is more likely when the opponent plays c (resp., d). Given any action profile, there is a probability of > 0 that exactly one player receives a wrong signal, and a probability of ξ > 0 that both players receive wrong signals. Bhaskar and Obara present for each 0 < x < 1 a symmetric sequential equilibrium s x that yields a payoff of at least
x whenever and ξ are sufficiently small. This construction is the key element in their folk theorem result.
In what follows I sketch this equilibrium s x , and then show that it is not weakly stable.
Let s T be the trigger strategy: cooperate as long as all observed signals are C-s, and defect in the remaining game if signal D is ever observed. The strategy s x divides the set of periods into disjoint sequences (say, into n sequences, (T 1 , ..., T n ), where sequence T k includes the periods that are equal to k modulo n), and the play in each sequence is independent of the other sequences. Each player mixes in the first round of each sequence: he plays s T (trigger strategy) with probability π and plays s d (always defect) with the remaining probability. Bhaskar and Obara show that there exist a division into sequences and a mixing probability π such that (1) the expected discounted symmetric payoff of the game is at least x, and (2) strategy s x is a sequential equilibrium. 
A Analysis of Asymmetric Games
The main text analyzes stability of symmetric equilibria in symmetric games, as this is the setup analyzed in most of the evolutionary game theory literature. In many applications, there are observable differences between the agents (e.g., age, sex, and status), which can be perceived by both agents and upon which behavior can be conditioned. When these differences are payoff-relevant (or monitoring-relevant), the repeated game is asymmetric, and when the differences are payoff-irrelevant, the underlying game is symmetric, but agents can still condition their play on these observable differences. For brevity, we will use the notion of asymmetric games to refer to both situations. The appendix adapts the notions of stability and extends the main results to deal with asymmetric games.
A.1 Definitions of Stability in Asymmetric Games
In this subsection I adapt the notions of stability to the setup of asymmetric games (see Weibull, 1995, Chapter 2.7 and Van Damme, 1991, Sections 9.5-9.8, for introductory textbooks.) I consider a large population of agents (technically, a continuum) in which agents are drawn to play a two-person repeated game, and at the beginning of each such repeated interaction, nature randomly determines who will be player 1 and who will be player 2, such that each agent has a probability of 50% of being in each role.
Each agent in the population follows a strategy profile (s 1 , s 2 ), where each s i describes the behavior of the agent when he is assigned to play the role of player i. The (ex-ante) expected payoff of an agent who follows strategy profile (s 1 , s 2 ) and is matched with a partner who follows strategy profile (s 1 , s 2 ) is
which is the average agent's payoff in each of the two possible roles.
A strategy profile (s * 1 , s * 2 ) is a Nash equilibrium if it is the best reply against itself, i.e.,:
2 ) denote the set of strategy profiles that are best replies against the strategy profile (s * 1 , s * 2 ), i.e.,
Recall that π Given a strategy profile (s 1 , s 2 ), let [(s 1 , s 2 )] denote its equivalent set (i.e., the set of strategies that are outcome-equivalent to (s 1 , s 2 )).
A Nash equilibrium (s * 1 , s * 2 ) is evolutionarily stable if the incumbents (who follow (s * 1 , s * 2 )), achieve a higher payoff against any best-replying mutants (who follow strategy profile (s 1 , s 2 )). Formally:
Definition 11 (Taylor, 1979; Weibull, 1995, Chapter 5.1 
A.2 Result for Generic Asymmetric Games
In this subsection I show how to adapt Proposition 2 to deal with asymmetric games. I say that a game is generic if: (1) the same number does not appear twice in the same column of the payoff matrix of player i, and (2) for each two pairs of actions {(a 1 , a 2 ) , (a 1 , a 2 )} in the support of a mixed equilibrium, the average payoff conditional on the players playing either of these action profiles is not exactly the same as the average payoff conditional on the players playing either of the "crossed" action profiles {(a 1 , a 2 ) , (a 1 , a 2 )}. Both properties hold with probability one if each payoff is independently distributed from a continuous (atomless) distribution. Formally, for each action profile (a 1 , a 2 ) ∈ A 1 ×A 2 letū (a 1 , a 2 ) := 0.5·(u 1 (a 1 , a 2 ) + u 2 (a 1 , a 2 )) denote the average payoff of two players who follow the action profile (a 1 , a 2 ).
Definition 14.
A normal-form game G = ((A 1 , A 2 ) , u) is generic if it satisfies the following two conditions: 1. For any player i and any actions a i = a i ⊆ A i and a −i ∈ A −i , the following inequality holds:
2. For any pair of non-empty subsets of actions A 1 ⊆ A 1 and A 2 ⊆ A 2 , any equilibrium (α 1 , α 2 ) ∈ ∆ (A 1 ) × ∆ (A 2 ) of the restricted game ((A 1 , A 2 ) , u), and any two pairs of actions a 1 = a 1 ∈ supp (α 1 ) and a 2 = a 2 ∈ supp (α 2 ), the following inequality holds:
Observe that the first requirement implies that if in a Nash equilibrium, one of the players plays a pure action, then it must be that the equilibrium is pure (for both players) and strict.
I say that a monitoring structure has a grain of informativeness if for any mixed action played by the players, the joint distribution of the action played and the signal observed by each player can be used as a Intuitively, the mild requirement of grain of informativeness is satisfied whenever the signal each player obtains (combined with his own action) is not completely uninformative about the partner's action.
The following result shows that if the game is generic and the monitoring structure has a grain of informativeness, then no non-trivial belief-free equilibrium satisfies neutral stability. ∈ T , implies that both players play a pure equilibrium in each period t / ∈ T , and that the players myopically best-reply to each other in roundt. Due to the fact that (s * 1 , s * 2 ) is a belief-free equilibrium, this implies that each action a i ∈ At i is a myopic best reply against the partner for any possible history of lengtht, which implies that the players play a Nash equilibrium of the stage game (which is independent of the observed history) in roundt, and that (s * 1 , s * 2 ) is trivial. Next, assume that there existst ∈ T such that the restricted game supp γt 1 , supp γt 2 , u admits an equilibrium in which either of the players plays a pure action. Due to the game being generic, this implies that this equilibrium, at 1 , at 2 , is pure (for both players) and strict. For each period t =t, let (α 2 ) is belief-free and the definition of (s 1 , s 2 ) imply that (1) (s 1 , s 2 ) is a best reply against (s * 1 , s * 2 ), and (2)Ū ((s * 1 , s * 2 ) , (s 1 , s 2 )) < U ((s 1 , s 2 ) , (s 1 , s 2 ) ). These implications contradict the assumption that (s * 1 , s * 2 ) is neutrally stable. Thus, we are left with the case in which there exist t 1 < t 2 ∈ T , such that the restricted normal-form game , u ) admits equilibrium β = (β 1 , β 2 ) (α = (α 1 , α 2 )) in which both players mix. Assume first that the LHS of (2) 
